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1. Introduction.
The standard framework in which economists evaluate environmental policies is cost-
benefit analysis. Consider, for example, a carbon tax to reduce global warming. By distorting
relative prices, this policy would impose an expected flow of costs on society in excess of
the government tax revenues it generates. Presumably, it also yields an expected flow of
benefits to society. Households and firms would burn less fuel, less CO2 would accumulate in
the atmosphere, global mean temperatures would not rise as much, and the damage caused
by higher temperatures would be correspondingly smaller. The standard framework would
recommend this policy if the present value of the expected flow of benefits exceeds the present
value of the expected flow of costs. Any debate among economists would likely be over the
expected costs and benefits, or over the choice of discount rate.'
This standard framework, however, ignores three important characteristics of most envi-
ronmental problems and the policies designed to respond to them. First, there is uncertainty
over the future costs and benefits of adopting a particular policy. With global warming, for
example, there is considerable uncertainty over how much average temperatures are likely
to rise with or without reduced CO 2 emissions, and also over the economic impact of higher
temperatures. Second, there are usually important irreversibilities associated with environ-
mental policy. These irreversibilities can arise with respect to environmental damage itself,
but also with respect to the costs of adapting to policies to reduce the damage. Third, the
adoption of an environmental policy is rarely a now or never proposition. In most cases it is
feasible to delay action and wait for new information.
Environmental policy design thus has something in common with the design of an irre-
versible investment policy. When a firm makes an irreversible investment, it gives up the
possibility of waiting for new information that might affect the desirability or timing of the
expenditure; it cannot disinvest should market conditions change adversely. This lost option
value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the cost of the investment
1There is a large literature on the choice of discount rate and its dependence on risk and rates of taxation.
For an overview, see Lind (1984). For a more recent study especially relevant to environmental policy, see
Weitzman (1994).
when doing net present value (NPV) calculations. Investment in a project is warranted only
when the present value of a project's expected cash flows exceeds the project's cost, at least
by an amount equal to the value of keeping the investment option alive. Hence a project
with a conventional NPV that is positive may in fact be uneconomical.2
In the case of environmental policy, the implications of irreversibility and uncertainty are
more complicated. The reason is that there are two kinds of irreversibilities, and they work
in opposite directions. First, policies aimed at reducing ecological damage impose sunk costs
on society. These sunk costs can take the form of discrete investments; for example, coal-
burning utilities might be forced to install scrubbers, or firms might have to scrap existing
machines and invest in more fuel-efficient ones. Or they can take the form of flows of
expenditures, e.g., a price premium paid by a utility for low-sulfur coal. In either case, such
sunk costs create an opportunity cost of adopting a policy now, rather than waiting for more
information about ecological impacts and their economic consequences. This opportunity
cost biases traditional cost-benefit analysis in favor of policy adoption. As with irreversible
investment decisions, the sunk costs associated with policy adoption can make it preferable
to wait rather than adopt the policy now.
Second, environmental damage can be partially or totally irreversible. For example,
increases in GHG concentrations are long lasting. Even if radical policies were adopted in
the future to drastically reduce GHG emissions, these concentrations (which have a natural
decay rate of about a half percent per year) would take many years to fall. In addition,
the damage to various ecosystems from higher global temperatures (or from acidified lakes
and streams, or from the clear-cutting of forests) can be permanent. This means that
adopting a policy now rather than waiting has a sunk benefit, i.e., a negative opportunity
cost. This negative opportunity cost biases traditional cost-benefit analysis against policy
adoption. Hence it may be desirable to adopt a policy now, even though the traditional
analysis declares it uneconomical.
This point regarding irreversible environmental damage was made nearly two decades
2For an introduction to and overview of the literature on irreversible investment, see Dixit (1992) and
Pindyck (1991). For a more detailed treatment, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
ago by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), and Krutilla and Fisher (1975), and has
been elaborated upon by Hanemann (1989), and Fisher and Hanemann (1990), among oth-
ers. However, little has been done to evaluate its practical importance, or to determine
whether (for particular environmental problems and policies) the sunk costs of policy adop-
tion outweigh the sunk benefits of environmental preservation. At issue is whether these
irreversibilities are important, and if so, what their overall effect is.
The answer is likely to depend on the nature and extent of uncertainty. In general, two
different types of uncertainty are relevant. The first, which I call "economic uncertainty," is
uncertainty over the future costs and benefits of environmental damage and its reduction.
In the context of global warming, for example, even if we knew how large a temperature
increase to expect from any particular increase in GHG concentrations, we would not know
what cost society will bear as a result. The reason is that we are unable to predict how a
particular temperature increase would affect agricultural output, land use, etc.3 Likewise,
even if we could predict the increase in acidity in lakes and rivers from NOX emissions, the
impact of this increase on fish and other organisms is uncertain and hence so is the social
cost. Indeed, for most environmental problems there is inherent uncertainty over the future
social cost of the environmental degradation, and thus over the social benefit of any policy
policy response.
Second, most environmental problems involve at least some degree of what I call "ecologi-
cal uncertainty," i.e., uncertainty over the evolution of various ecosystems and environmental
variables. For example, while we could specify a policy target for the rate of GHG emis-
sions over the next forty years, we would not know what the resulting levels of atmospheric
GHG concentrations will be at different points in time, nor would we know what the average
global equilibrium temperature increase would be, and how that increase would vary region-
ally. And even given assumptions about economic growth in different parts of the world,
predicting GHG emissions (in the absence or presence of policy intervention) is difficult,
3The impacts on agricultural output, for example, is likely to vary substantially from region to region,
and, as Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994) have pointed out, are likely to be mitigated by regional
shifts in land utilization.
and subject to considerable uncertainty.4 Similarly, we are unable to accurately predict how
particular levels of NOX emissions will affect the future acidity of lakes and rivers, or the
viability of the fish that live in them.
This paper develops a series of models to help elucidate the implications of irreversibility
and uncertainty for environmental policy. These models are intended to show how the sunk
costs of policy adoption and the sunk benefits of environmental preservation interact with
the two types of uncertainty described above. An objective is a framework that can be
applied to problems like global warming and acid rain, and that will yield at least rough
estimates of the bias inherent in a traditional cost-benefit analysis.
Two recent studies that are closely related to this paper deserve mention. First, Kolstad
(1992) developed a three-period model to study the implications of cost-benefit uncertainty
for the adoption of an emissions-reducing policy that can involve sunk costs. In his model,
the accumulated stock of pollutant is permanent. Emissions can be reduced in the first
or second periods, and between these periods there is a reduction in uncertainty over the
net benefits from a lower stock of pollutant. He shows that if there is no sunk cost of
policy adoption, then the faster the rate of learning, the lower the first-period emission level
should be. This is essentially a version of the result of Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry
(1974); because the stock of pollutant is permanent, society should pollute less now if there
is uncertainty over the future damage from the pollutant. But he also shows that if emission
control is irreversible (i.e., the costs of policy adoption are at least partly sunk), then the
effect of uncertainty on the initial level of emissions is ambiguous. 5
Second, Hendricks (1992) has developed a continuous-time model of global warming
similar to the one in this paper. As I do, he studies the timing of policies to irreversibly
4For a forecasting model of CO2 emissions with an explicit treatment of forecast uncertainty, see
Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judd (1995). For general discussions of the uncertainties inherent in the anal-
ysis of global warming, see Cline (1992) and Solow (1991), and, for a good overview of these uncertainties
and some of their policy implications, see Jacoby and Prinn (1994).
5In related work, Hammitt, Lempert, and Schlesinger (1992) use a two-period model to study implications
of uncertainty for adoption of policies to reduce GHG emissions, and show that under some conditions it
may be desirable to wait for additional information. Also, Kolstad (1994) examines GHG emission policy in
the context of a growth model with uncertainty and learning, and finds that temporary emission-reduction
policies dominate permanent ones.
reduce emissions, allowing for a (partially) irreversible accumulation of the pollutant. The
particular form of uncertainty he considers is over a parameter linking the global mean
temperature increase to the atmospheric GHG concentration, and he allows for learning by
assuming that the uncertainty over this parameter falls over some fixed period of time. He
focuses on how the speed of learning affects the timing of policy adoption. 6
Unlike these studies, I assume that while information is continually arriving over time,
there will always remain uncertainty over the future evolution of key environmental variables,
and over the future costs and benefits of policy adoption. I then focus on how the sunk costs
and sunk benefits of policy adoption interact with these uncertainties in affecting the timing
and design of policy. I do this by developing a series of models that are increasingly general
in terms of the policy choices they allow, and in terms of the types of uncertainty they
incorporate.
The next section begins by laying out the basic analytical framework for all of the models,
and shows how the design and timing of environmental policy in the presence of uncertainty
can be treated as an optimal stopping problem. Then, in Section 3, I begin with a simplified
problem in which an environmental policy can be adopted either today or at a specified future
time, and adoption entails a flow of sunk costs (some portion of which may be recoverable if
the policy is later removed). Limiting decisions to only two points in time makes it possible
to obtain and analyze optimal policies with minimal use of mathematics, and helps to clarify
the basic mechanism through which uncertainty (in this case over the future benefits from
reduced pollution) and the two kinds of irreversibilities affect the timing of policy adoption.
In Section 4, it is assumed that policy adoption can occur at any time, but there is
no uncertainty. Nonetheless, we will see that if the social cost of environmental damage
is growing over time (e.g., due to population growth), it may be desirable to delay policy
adoption and thereby discount its cost, even when a standard cost-benefit analysis would
indicate immediate adoption.
6Although he does not do so, Hendricks could also use his model to study the implications of the degree
of irreversibility of environmental damage. This could be done by varying the parameter that describes the
rate of natural GHG removal from the atmosphere.
Sections 5 to 8 develop models of policy adoption under uncertainty in continuous time.
In Section 5, it is assumed once again that a policy to reduce emissions can be adopted at
any time, but now economic uncertainty is introduced. I first consider the case in which
policy adoption implies reducing emissions to zero, and then the case in which the size of
the reduction can be chosen optimally at the time of adoption. In addition, I examine the
policy timing problem for both linear and convex economic benefit functions. In Section 6, I
allow for gradual emission reductions, again in the presence of economic uncertainty. Section
7 examines the implications of ecological uncertainty. Finally, Section 8 presents a general
model that includes both economic and ecological uncertainty.
2. Analytical Framework.
In a traditional cost-benefit analysis of environmental policy, the problem typically boils
down to whether or not a particular policy should be adopted. When irreversibilities are in-
volved, the more appropriate question is when (if ever) a particular policy should be adopted.
In other words, adopting a policy today competes not only with never adopting the policy,
but also with adopting the policy next year, adopting it in two years, and so on. The policy
problem becomes one of optimal timing.
This is exactly analogous to the optimal irreversible investment problem. The NPV
criterion tells us to invest in a project when the present value of the expected payoff stream
from the project just exceeds the present value of the cost. But this criterion implicitly
compares investing today with never investing. When the investment is at least partly
irreversible and the firm can delay, the correct comparison is investing today versus waiting
for more information to arrive and perhaps investing at some point in the future. The
problem is again one of optimal timing.
This analogy also holds when policies can be reversed, either totally or partially. When an
environmental policy is adopted, it leads to flows of expenditures by firms and consumers that
are in part sunk, i.e., irreversible. If, after a number of years, we learn that the environmental
problem that the policy seeks to remedy is actually much less of a problem than had been
expected, the policy might be reversed, perhaps limiting these flows of sunk costs. With
ongoing uncertainty, deciding when to reverse the policy is also an optimal timing problem.
(The reason is that the decision to reverse also has a sunk cost component, and could lead to
regret if some years later new information leads to greater concern with the environmental
problem.) Likewise, a firm that can exit a market and recover part of its sunk costs must
decide on the timing of exit, as well as the timing of entry.'
In order to get at the basic issues and obtain results that are reasonably easy to interpret,
it is best to begin with a model that captures the basic stock externality associated with
many environmental problems in as simple a way as possible, while still allowing us to capture
key sources of uncertainty. Let Mt be a state variable that summarizes one or more stocks
of environmental pollutants. For example, M might be the average concentration of CO 2 in
the atmosphere, the acidity level of a lake, the number of plant or animal species in a forest,
or the concentrations of a mix of pollutants that make up urban smog. Let Et be a flow
variable that controls Mr. For example, E might be the rate of CO 2 or SO2 emissions, or
a rate of deforestation. We will assume that absent some policy intervention, Et follows an
exogenous (and possibly stochastic) trajectory. Ignoring uncertainty for the time being, the
evolution of Mt is then given by:
dM/dt = OE(t) - SM(t), (1)
where 8 is the natural rate at which the stock of pollutant dissapates over time.
So far I have described a simplified version of a basic diffusion model used by Nordhaus
(1991) to compare costs and benefits of policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
That model supplements eqn. (1) with an adjustment process for temperature:
dT/dt = a[4uM(t) - T(t)], (2)
where T is the increase in mean temperature from GHGs, M is atmospheric GHG concen-
tration from industrial activity, and a is a delay parameter. Associated with a higher T is
a (global) economic cost resulting from, among other things, land loss due to a rising sea
'This issue of investment timing when there is partial reversibility is explored in Dixit and Pindyck (1994,
1995).
level, and reduced agricultural output due to climate change. I am simplifying the Nordhaus
model by dropping the variable T along with eqn. (2), and associating an economic cost
directly with M.8 Also, note that eqn. (1) is deterministic; later I will introduce ecological
uncertainty by generalizing this equation so that M follows a controlled diffusion process.
I will assume that the flow of social cost (i.e., negative benefit) associated with the stock
variable Mt is specified by a function B(Mt, Ot), where Ot is a variable that shifts over time,
perhaps stochastically, to reflect changes in tastes and technologies. For example, if M is
the GHG concentration, shifts in 0 might reflect new agricultural techniques that reduce the
cost of a higher M, or alternatively, demographic changes that raise the cost. Or, if M is
the concentration of an industrial pollutant collecting in a body of water and damaging the
fish population, shifts in 0 might reflect changes in the price of fish, or changes in the value
of sport fishing.
Later we will explore the implications of different functional forms for B(Mt, Ot), but for
the time being I will assume that it is simply:
B(Mt, Ot) = -OtMt. (3)
In the next section, uncertainty over the future costs and benefits of policy adoption will be
introduced by letting 0 follow a stochastic process.
We will be interested in the design and timing of policies that change the evolution of
Et, typically making it smaller than it would be otherwise. The implications of uncertainties
and irreversibilities are easiest to understand by focussing on policies that are introduced
at a specific point in time, and that have a long-term impact on the evolution of Et. (In
later sections of the paper we will also consider policies that are introduced gradually and
can be modified from time to time.) Consider a policy introduced at time T that changes
the evolution of Et for t > T. Such a policy would presumably impose a flow of costs on
society, some portion of which will be sunk. We will denote the present value (at time T) of
the expected flow of sunk costs associated with this policy by K(ET, w), where w is a vector
'Because of the linearity of eqns. (2) and (1), both could have been retained in all of the analyses that
follow (with an economic cost associated with T, or with both M and T). The basic qualitative results would
remain the same.
of policy characteristics. For example, w might describe an absolute reduction in Et, or a
reduction in the expected rate of growth in Et compared to what it would be absent the
policy.9
Again in the interests of clarity, we will start out by making some very restrictive as-
sumptions about the evolution Et, and about possible policies to change Et. Specifically,
we will assume that until a policy is adopted, the rate of emissions Et stays at the constant
initial level E0. Policy adoption involves a once-and-for-all reduction in Et to some new and
permanent level El, with 0 < E1 < Eo. I will also begin by assuming, again for simplicity,
that the social cost of adopting this policy is completely sunk, and its present value at the
time of adoption is a convex function of the size of the emission reduction, which I denote by
K(E 1). Note that the policy might entail a flow of sunk costs over time (e.g., expenditures
for insulation on all new homes). All that matters is that adopting the policy implies a
commitment to this flow of costs, so that we can replace the flow with its present value at
the time of adoption.
It is easy to generalize this problem so that the policy involves gradual reductions in the
emission rate, so that only part of the costs of adopting the policy are sunk, and so that
the policy can be reversed in the future, leading to a partial recovery of the sunk cost K.
I will discuss such generalizations later, although they do little to change the basic results.
At this point, note that the policy problem involves a choice of timing, and (at the time of
adoption) a choice of how much to reduce emissions.
The policy objective is to maximize the net present value function:
W = Eo B(Mt, 0t)e-r t dt - £oK(E1)e - r , (4)
subject to eqn. (1). Here, T is the (in general, unknown) time that the policy is adopted,
Eo - E1 is the amount that emissions are reduced, Eo denotes the expectation at time t = 0,
9 For example, we might have an emission level Et that, absent a policy intervention, will grow stochasti-
cally according to:
dEt = cEEtdt + aEEtdzE .
Then, a policy might involve a one-time reduction in ET (thereby reducing the expected value of Et for all
t > T), or it might involve a reduction in aE, the expected rate of growth of Et.
and r is the discount rate. This is an optimal stopping problem. Specifically, we must find
a rule that tells us when it is optimal to commit to spending K to reduce Et, given the
(possibly stochastic) dependence of Mt on Et, and given the stochastic evolution of Ot. As
we will see, this stopping rule will not give us the particular time at which to adopt the
policy, but rather conditions that Mt and Ot must meet for adoption to be optimal. Hence
the time of adoption, t, is a random variable.
We will approach this optimal stopping problem in steps, first considering the case of
no uncertainty, and, for simplicity, assuming that the policy involves reducing Et to zero.
Then, we will introduce uncertainty over the evolution of Ot, over Mt, and finally over both.
We will also generalize the problem so that emission reduction can be done gradually, rather
than all at once, and so that the policy can be reversed and emissions allowed to rise again.
First, however, it will be helpful to look at a much simpler version of this problem of policy
timing under uncertainty.
3. A Simplified Problem.
The usual evaluation of an environmental policy compares the outcome of adopting the
policy today with the outcome of never adopting it. As a simple first step, let us introduce a
third possibility - the option of adopting the policy at some fized time T in the future. In
other words, one can decide to adopt the policy today, one can wait until time T and then,
after evaluating the situation, decide whether or not to adopt the policy, or one can decide
now to never adopt the policy. Since this last possibility is clearly suboptimal, the choice
boils down to adopting the policy now or waiting until time T to decide.
We will begin by assuming that if the policy is adopted, emissions are reduced from Eo
to zero. Hence the cost of policy adoption is simply a number, K, which we will assume
is complete sunk. Later in this section we will consider the possibility of reducing E to
some level E1 > 0. We will also examine the adoption decision when the policy is partially
reversible - if adopted now, it can be reversed at time T, leading to the recovery of some
fraction 0 of the sunk cost K.
For this problem to be interesting, we need to introduce some source of uncertainty. I
will assume that there is cost-benefit uncertainty but not ecological uncertainty, i.e., there
is uncertainty over the evolution of Ot but not over the evolution of Mr. To keep matters
as simple as possible, I will assume that OT will equal 0 or 9 with equal probability, with
0 < 0 and !(I + 8) = 00, the current value of 0. I will also assume that 0 does not change
after time T. Finally, I will consider the following decision rule that applies if we wait until
time T: Adopt the policy if and only if OT = 9. (I will choose parameter values so that
this is indeed the optimal policy at time T.) Later we will see that this very limited form
of uncertainty over the evolution of 0 can be generalized considerably without affecting the
basic qualitative results.
By solving eqn. (1), we can determine Mt as a function of time. Suppose the policy is
adopted at time T, so that Et = Eo for t < T and Et = 0 for t > T. Then it is easy to
confirm that Mt is given by:
M (PEo/6)(1 - e-6 t ) + Moe'6 t  for 0 < t < T
A (gEo/6)(e6 T - 1)e-6 t + Moe- t  for t > T (5)
where Mo is the initial value of Mt. If the policy is never adopted, the first line of eqn. (5)
applies for all t, so that Mt asymptotically approaches Eo0/6. If the policy is adopted at
time 0, then Mt = Moe - t .
First, suppose that the policy is never adopted. Then, denoting the value function in
this case by WN:
WN = - 0oMte - t dt
= -Oo [(#Eo/6)(1 - e6 ') + Moe-st e-t dt
0Mo EoOo (6)
(r + 6) r(r + 6)
Next, suppose the policy is adopted at time t = 0. Then Et = 0 always, and the value
function is:
0oMoWo = K. (7)
r+6
Note that a conventional cost-benefit analysis would recommend adoption of the policy if
the net present value Wo - WN is positive.
Let us introduce some numbers so that we can compare these two alternatives. I will
assume that the present value of the cost to society of policy adoption is $2 billion. I will
set r = .04, 6 = .02, / = 1 (i.e., emissions are completely absorbed into the ecosystem), Eo
= 300,000 tons/year, and 00 = $20/ton/year.'0 In what follows, I will also assume that 0 =
$10/ton/year, and 0 = $30/ton/year.
Given these numbers, 3Eo0o/r(r + 6) = $2.5 billion. Since the conventionally measured
NPV of policy adoption is Wo - WN = fEoOo/r(r + 6) - K = $0.5 billion, it would appear
desirable to adopt the policy now.
Suppose that instead we wait until time t = T and then adopt the policy only if OT =
9. Denoting the value function in this case by WT, using eqn. (5), and noting that the
probability that OT = 0 is .5, we have:
WT = oEo =Eo (00 - 10)e-' - 'Ke~'". (8)
r+6 r ) r(r + 6) 2- (8)
Is it better to adopt the policy at time t = 0 or wait until T? We can decide by comparing
Wo to WT:
A W = WT - Wo
= (1 e ) - Eoo ( 1 - e- ) - Eo e-T (9)2 r(r + 6) 2r(r + 6) (9)
The first term on the right-hand side of eqn. (9) is the present value of the net expected
cost savings from delay; the sunk cost K is initially avoided, and there is only a .5 probability
that it will have to be incurred at the later time T. Hence this term represents the oppor-
tunity cost of adopting the policy now rather than waiting. The second and third terms
on the RHS of eqn. (9) are the present value of the expected increase in social cost from
environmental damage due to delay. The second term is the the social cost of additional
pollution between now and time T that results from delaying policy adoption. The last term
in the equation - the probability that OT = 9, times the present value of the social cost of
I01 am implicitly assuming that the discount rate r is the real risk-free rate of interest, so a value of .04 is
reasonable. A value of .02 for 6 is high for the rate of natural removal of atmospheric GHGs (a concensus
estimate would be closer to .005), but is low for acid concentrations in lakes.
additional polluition over time when OT = 0 and Et = Eo for t > T - is the expected pollu-
tion cost from time T onwards. Thus the last two terms together represent an opportunity
"benefit" of adopting the policy now rather than waiting.
We can therefore rewrite eqn. (9) as:
AWT= Fc - F ,
where
Fc = K(1 - le-rT) (10)
is the opportunity cost of adopting the policy now rather than waiting, and
OEoOo 
_,. EoO 
_rTFB = (1- r~•  - e)+ 2r- ) e (11)
r(r + 6) 2r(r + 6)
is the opportunity "benefit" of adopting now rather than waiting. Note that the larger is the
decay rate 6, i.e., the more reversible is environmental damage, the smaller is this benefit,
and hence the greater is the incentive to delay. An increase in the discount rate, r, increases
the cost Fc and reduces the benefit FE, and thus also increases the incentive to delay.
In general, we can decide whether it is better to wait or adopt the policy now by calcu-
lating Fc and FB. For our numerical example, we will assume (arbitrarily) that the fixed
time Y is 10 years. Substituting this and the other base case parameter values into eqns.
(10) and (11) gives Fc = $1.330 billion and FE = 0.824 + 0.419 = $1.243 billion. Hence
AWT = Fc - FE = $0.087, so it is better to wait rather than adopt the policy now. In this
case the sunk cost of current adoption slightly outweighs the sunk benefit.
We assumed in these calculations that if we delayed the adoption decision until time T,
it would be optimal to adopt the policy if OT = j, but not if OT = 0. To check that this is
indeed the case, we can calculate the smallest value of OT for which policy adoption at time
T is optimal. Since there is no possibility of delay after time T, this is just the value of 0 for
which Wo - WN is zero. Denoting this value by 0T and using eqns. (7) and (6), we see that
it is given by:
OT = r(r + 8)K/PEo. (12)
For our base case parameter values, OT = $16/ton/year. Hence it would indeed be optimal
to adopt the policy at time T if 0 T O= = 30, but not if 0T = I = 10.
Also, we assumed that policy adoption meant reducing E to zero. We could have instead
considered policies to reduce E by some fixed percentage, or considered what the optimal
amount of reduction should be. However, we have assumed that the social cost function
B(Mt, Ot) is linear in Mt, and because Mt depends linearly on E (see eqn. (5)), the benefit
of a marginal reduction in E is independent of the level of E. Suppose, in addition, that
the cost of reducing E is proportional to the size of the reduction. Then if it is optimal to
reduce E at all, it will be optimal to reduce it to zero, so that the optimal timing of the
reduction is independent of the size of the reduction. This will not be the case, however, if
the social cost function is convex in Mt, and/or the cost of emission reduction is a convex
function of the size of the reduction. We will discuss this further below.
Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and a "Good News Principle."
We have assumed that the cost of adopting the policy is completely sunk, but the benefit
(in terms of reduced environmental damage) is only partially sunk (because 6 > 0). Contin-
uing with our numerical example, we can get further insight into the effects of irreversibility
and uncertainty by varying the degree to which the policy benefit is sunk, and by varying
the amount of uncertainty over OT.
First, suppose that the rate at which pollutants are naturally removed from the ecosystem
is slower than assumed earlier - specifically, that the parameter 6 is .01 instead of .02. Note
that Fc will equal $1.330 billion as before, but now FE = 0.989 + 0.503 = $1.492 billion,
so that AWT = -$0.162 billion. In this case the greater irreversibility of environmental
damage makes the sunk benefit of current adoption greater than the sunk cost, so that it is
better to adopt the policy now.
Second, let us increase the variance of OT (while keeping its expectation the same) by
setting 0 and j equal to 0 and 40 respectively, instead of 10 and 30. This change has no
effect on the sunk cost of adopting now, because there is still a .5 probability that at time
T we will regret having made the decision to spend K and adopt the policy; note that Fc
is $1.330 billion as before. However, this increase in variance reduces the sunk benefit of
immediate adoption by reducing the social cost of additional pollution for t > T under the
"good" outcome (i.e, the outcome that rT = 0). Setting 6 equal to its base case value of .02,
we now have FE = .824 + 0 = $0.824 billion, so that AWT = 1.330 - 0.824 = $0.506 billion,
which is much larger than before. Even if we increase the irreversibility of environmental
damage by setting 6 equal to .01, FE = .989, so that AWT = $0.341 billion and it is still
optimal to wait.
This important result is an example of Bernanke's (1983) "bad news principle," although
here we might call it a "good news principle." It is only the consequences of the outcome
Or = 0 - an outcome that is good news for society, but bad news for the ex post return
on policy-induced installed capital - that drive the net value of waiting. The consequences
of the "bad" outcome, i.e., the outcome rT = j, make no difference whatsoever in this
calculation.
This good news principle might seem counterintuitive at first. Given the long-lasting
impact of environmental damage, one might think that the consequences of the high social
cost outcome (i.e., the outcome OT = 9) should affect the decision to wait and continue
polluting instead of adopting the policy now. But since the expected value of OT remains the
same as we increase the variance, the value of waiting depends only on the regret that is
avoided under the good (low social cost) outcome. Increasing the variance of Or increases
the regret that society would experience under the good outcome, and thereby increases the
incentive to wait. Shortly we will see that this result holds even if we allow for a policy
adopted at time 0 to be reversed at time T, with partial recovery of the sunk cost K.
Generalizing the Process for Ot.
Our assumptions about the evolution of Ot are extremely restrictive - it can have only
two possible values at time T, and does not change after time T. The same basic results
will hold, however, if 0,t follows a more general process. For example, suppose Ot follows the
geometric Brownian motion:
dO = aOdt + rOdz. (13)
Once again, we will assume that the policy can be adopted now, or at some fixed time T
in the future. Should we wait until time T, we will adopt the policy if and only if OT > Or,
where OT defines the optimal stopping rule. Hence we first need to find the smallest 9T such
that we would want to adopt the policy if 0T were above this value. Since there is no option
to delay the adoption decision beyond time T, this is straightforward. As before, we use
eqns. (7) and (6) to find Wo - WN, and then set this equal to zero, with 0T replacing 0o.
Since 00ot = Ooe "t, we get
OT = (r - a)(r - a + 6)K/PEo. (14)
Note that if a = 0, this is identical to eqn. (12) above, and for our base case parameters, 0T
is again equal to $16.
To determine whether it is optimal to wait rather than adopt the policy now, we again
calculate AWT = Fc-FB. Let pT equal the probability that OT < OT. Since OT is lognormally
distributed and we know the value of 0T, we can find pr numerically (or from a table of the
lognormal distribution). Next, let _0= o(OTIOT < OT). (This can likewise be calculated by a
simple numerical integration.) Then, eqns. (10) and (11) for Fc and FB again apply, except
that the 1 in each is replaced by PT.
It is easy to see that a change in 6, or a change in the variance of OT (in this case a change
in a), will have the same general effects as before. Consider an decrease in 6. As before,
Fc will not change, but FB will increase since the stock of pollutant is longer lasting. If the
increase in FB is sufficiently large, it may shift the optimal timing from t = 0 to t = T. Next,
consider what happens if a increases. Again, this has no effect on Fc. But an increase in
the variance of OT implies a decrease in 0, so that FB falls. This is the "good news principle"
again - an increase in uncertainty over OT tends to delay policy adoption by exacerbating
the "downside" risk associated with current policy-related sunk costs.
Allowing for Policy Reversal.
So far we have assumed that a policy to reduce emissions to zero could be adopted at
time 0 or time T, but once adopted, the policy would remain in place indefinitely. Now we
will see how the timing decision changes when a policy that has been adopted at time 0 can
be reversed at time T. We will assume that upon reversal, a fraction 0 of the policy-induced
cost K can be recovered. A partial recovery of K would be possible, for example, if K was at
least in part the present value of a flow of sunk costs that could be terminated upon reversal
of the policy. (Of course, the investment decisions of firms and consumers in reponse to a
policy adopted at time 0 would be altered by the awareness that there was some probability
of policy reversal at time T. For example, consumers and firms would probably delay some
of their emission-reducing investments until they learned, at time T, whether the policy was
going to be reversed. But this is consistent with the theory; it simply makes the fraction 
€
larger than it would be without such awareness.)
We will assume as we did earlier that 0T can have one of two values, 0 or 0. We will also
assume that the parameter values are such that if the policy was not adopted at t = 0, it
would adopted at t = T if and only if OT = 0. However, if the policy is adopted at t = 0,
would we want to remove it at time T if 0 T = 0? Clearly, this will depend on 6.
As before, we will let Wo denote the value function when we adopt the policy at time 0.
But now, Wo must include the value of society's option (a put option) to reverse the policy
at time T and recover rK. We will again let WT denote the value function when we wait
and only adopt the policy if 0T = 0. (In this simple two-period framework, we do not allow
for the possibility of reversing the policy after time T.) To determine Wo, we need to know
the trajectory for Mt when the policy is adopted at t = 0 and reversed at t = T. Solving
eqn. (1), that trajectory is given by:
( Moe- t  for 0 < t < T
M = (Eo/6) [1 - e-6(t- T)] + Moe -' t  for t > T (15)
Now we can determine the minimum value of 0 for which it would economical to reverse
the policy at t = T should OT = 0. It is economical to remove the policy as long as the
present value of the cost of continued emissions is less than the recoverable cost OK, i.e., as
long as:
(E 0o/S) [1- e(t - T)] e- r ( '- T) dt < OK, (16)
which implies
PEo0
,-inf > r ) . (17)
r(r + 6)K
For our numerical example, with 0 = $10/ton/year, Omin = .838. Thus if 0 < .838, the
option to reverse the policy at time T has no value, and our earlier results still hold.
Suppose 4 = .90, so that the policy would indeed be reversed if 0T = 0. Although WT is
still given by eqn. (8), using eqn. (15), Wo is now given by:
o 00Mo - -rT 1 -rT
Wo M = ) + •10Ke - K. (18)
r + 6 2r(r + 6)
The second and third terms on the right-hand side of this equation represent the value of
option to reverse the policy at time T.
Using eqns. (8) and (18), we find that AWT = WT - Wo is now given by:
AWT = r oOo (1 - e-rT) + K 1 - (1 + )e-'T] . (19)
The first term on the right-hand side of (19) is the "opportunity benefit" of early policy
adoption, which we have denoted by FB, and the second term is the opportunity cost of
early adoption, denoted by Fc. Comparing this to eqn. (11), we see that FE no longer has
the term in 0, because now if 0 T = 0 the policy will be reversed.
Let us return to our numerical example, with 0 = .9. In this case,
AWT = -$824.2 million + $726.4 million = -$97.6 million,
so it is better to adopt the policy at time 0, rather than wait. The reason is that now Fo,
the opportunity cost of adopting now, is much smaller because of the option to reverse the
policy later.
Suppose we increase the variance of OT keeping its mean the same. As we did earlier, we
will let 0 and a be 0 and 40 respectively, rather than 10 and 30. If 0 = .9, AWT = -$97.6
million as before, so the policy should still be adopted now. But note that increasing the
variance of OT reduces the minimum value of € at which it is optimal to reverse the policy
if 0 T = 0. From eqn. (17), we see that now m. = 0. But this does not mean that as long
as 0 = 0, the policy should be adopted now for any positive value of 0. For example, if
€ = .1, AWT = $438.4 million, so it is clearly better to wait. By setting AWT = 0 (again
with 0 = 0), we can find the smallest value of € for which early adoption is optimal. Using
eqn. (19), that value is 0 = .754. For values of 0 above .754, the put option is sufficiently
valuable so that early adoption is economical.
Although 0 does not appear in eqn. (19), it is still only _, and not 9, that affects the
timing decision. The reason is that only 0 affects 0nk, and hence the decision to exercise
the put option should this low value of 0T be realized. This is another example of the "good
news principle" that arose earlier.
Partial Reduction in Emissions.
Before moving to a more general model in which the time of adoption can be chosen
freely, we can exploit this simple framework still further by allowing for a partial reduction
in emissions. As discussed earlier, this extension is of interest only if the cost of policy
adoption is a convex function of the amount of emission reduction (or, alternatively, the
benefit function B(Mt, Ot) is convex in Me). Suppose that the cost of reducing E from Eo to
E1 _ 0 is given by:
K = ki(Eo - E1 ) + k2(Eo - E1 )2 , (20)
with kI, k2 2 0. Then the cost of a 1-unit (permanent) reduction in E, given that currently
E = El, is:
dKk(E) = dE - ki + 2k2(Eo - E). (21)
The problem now is to decide when to adopt a policy, and then, at the time of adoption, to
decide by how much to reduce emissions. As before, we will assume that 0 T will equal 0 or
j with equal probability, and that 0 does not change after time T. For simplicity, we will
assume that once a policy has been adopted it cannot be reversed.
Previously we solved eqn. (1) to determine Mt when Et = Eo for t < T and Et = 0 for
t > T. Now, policy adoption at time T implies Et = E1 > 0 for t > T. In this case, the
solution for Mt is given by:"
Mt = (#Eo/6)(1 - e-6t ) + Moe - t  for 0 < t < T
( (6Eo/6)(e6 T - 1)e-6t + (3E1/6)[1 - e- 6(t-T )] + Moe - It for t > T
First, suppose we reduce E from Eo to an arbitrary level El at t = 0. Then the value
function is:
0oMo BE100
Wo(Ej) = -OoK(EI) (23)
r + 6 r(r + 6)
If we never adopt the policy, the value function is WN = -OoMo/(r + 6) - 3EoOo/r(r + 6),
as before. Hence the conventionally measured NPV of policy adoption is:
P(Eo - E,)OoWo(E,) - WN = O(E ) - K(E1). (24)
r(r + 8)
If we indeed adopt the policy at t = 0, we will choose El to maximize this NPV. Using eqn.
(20) for K(El), the optimal El is:
k, 300
E( = Eo + (25)2k 2  2k 2r(r + )'25)
for 3Oo/r(r + 6) > kI, and 0 otherwise. Assuming Oo/r(r + 6) > k, and El = El, the NPV
becomes:
Wo(E ) - WN =4 [( 00 - ki . (26)4k2 r(r + b)
Note that because E1 is chosen optimally, this NPV is never negative.
A numerical example is again helpful. We will use the same parameter values as before,
i.e., r = .04, 6 = .02, 8 = 1, 8o = $20/ton/year, 8 = $30/ton/year, 8 = $10/ton/year, and Eo
= 300,000 tons/year. Suppose that ki = 4000 and k2 = .02. (Then reducing E from 300,000
tons/year to zero would cost $3.0 billion.) In this case, AE* = Eo - E( = 108,333 tons/year,
K(AE*) = $0.668 billion, and the NPV of immediate policy adoption is Wo(E;) - WN =
$0.234 billion.
Now suppose that we instead wait until time T (= 10 years) to decide how much (if at
all) to reduce emissions. If OT = 0 we will reduce emissions to E, but if OT = 0 we will
"Note that Mt must now satisfy the boundary conditions MT = (OEo/6)(1 - e-6T) + Moe -6 T and
Moo = PE,/6.
reduce emissions by a smaller amount, to E, with E > F. Using eqn. (22) for Mt and for
now letting E and E be arbitrary, we can determine that the value function WT(E, E) is:
GoMo 3Eo0o pe-rTWT(E, E) = (1 - e- T ) -(EO + EO)
r + 6 r(r + 6) 2r(r + 6)
- K(E)e - 1(E)eT (27)
The values of E and E must be chosen optimally to maximize WT(E, T). Those values are:
E = Eo+ (28)2k 2  2k 2r(r + 6)' (28)
7 = Eo + ki 0 (29)2k 2  2k 2r(r + 6) (29)
Should we reduce emissions now or wait until time T so that we can observe OT? As
before, we compare W0 to WT, but now accounting for the fact that the amount of emission
reduction is determined optimally at the time of adoption, i.e., at t = 0 or t = T. To
determine whether it is better to wait, we must calculate AWT = WT(E,F) - Wo(E').
Substituting E7 and TE into eqn. (27) and E( into eqn. (23) gives:
ki A00 ki ,0(? + #)2 0AWT = k1  - (1 - T) 0 _ W + + e( (30)2k2 Ir(r + 6) 2 4k 2r2 (r + 5)2 8k 2r 2(r + 6)2
Using eqns. (25), (28), and (29), we can calculate that for our numerical example, EZ
= 191,667 tons/year, E* = 295,833, and E" = 87,500. Hence we find that AWT = $0.068
billion. In this case the opportunity cost of reducing emissions immediately outweighs the
sunk benefit. Therefore it is better to wait until time T, and then reduce emissions by a
large amount if 0T = 8, but reduce them only slightly if 0T = 0. But note that this outcome
is dependent on our choice of parameters for the cost function K. For example, if we reduce
ki from 4000 to 1000 (so that the cost of eliminating the first ton of emissions is only $1,000),
AWT becomes -$0.076 billion, so that immediate policy adoption is preferred. The reason
is that now a greater reduction in E is optimal for any 0 (now E( = 116,667, E* = 220,833,
and E = 12,500), so that the sunk benefit of immediately reducing E is larger, and the
sunk cost smaller.
As with the simpler versions of this two-period model, the timing decision also depends
on the variance of OT. To see this, let us increase the variance by setting 9 and a to 40
and 0 respectively. Now, using eqns. (25), (28), and (29) again, we see that Ej' = 191,667
tons/year as before, but E* = 400,000 tons/year, 17 = 0, and AWT = $0.504 billion. 12
Hence the value of waiting increases. The reason is that the spread between E* and E7 is
now larger, so that information arriving at time T has a bigger impact on policy actions,
and on the outcomes of those actions.
This simplified problem illustrates how the optimal timing of policy adoption can be
affected in opposing ways by the interaction of uncertainty with each of two kinds of irre-
versibilities. For example, by reducing the rate at which pollutants are naturally removed
from the ecosystem (making environmental damage more irreversible), we increased the sunk
benefit of early policy adoption to the point where it outweighed the sunk cost. To explore
this tradeoff further, and determine how it depends on different sources of uncertainty, we
need to move to a more general formulation in which the time of adoption is a free choice
variable.
4. Optimal Timing in a World of Certainty.
At this point it might appear that in the absence of uncertainty, irreversibilities can be
disregarded, so that standard cost-benefit analysis will apply. As we will see, if the social
cost of the stock of pollutant (as measured by 0 in this model) is growing over time, it may be
optimal to wait rather than adopting a policy now, and thereby allowing the postponement
(and thus discounting) of the sunk cost K. We can explore this, and get further insight into
the optimal timing of policy, by generalizing our model so that Ot evolves continuously (but
deterministically) over time, and allowing the policy to be adopted at any point in time,
rather than either immediately or at a fixed time T as in the preceding section. Once again,
for simplicity we will begin by assuming that policy adoption implies that Et is reduced from
Eo to zero.
12Using eqn. (29), E = -16,667. But we assume that negative values of E are not possible, so that E
will be reduced to 0 if 0T = 6.
We will let 9 grow at the constant rate a, so that Ot = 0 0ext . Letting T be the time
the policy is adopted (which is yet to be determined), and using eqn. (5) for Mt, the value
function is given by:
W = max - (1 - e-6 )e(-r)t dt - E ( 1) e-r6)t dt - Ke- T}
= max - OEo[l - Ke - ' T  (31)T (r- a)(r+ 6-a)
Maximizing with respect to T yields:
I3Eooe'T =rK. (32)
r +6- a
Since 00e " T = OT, condition (32) implies that the policy should be adopted once 0 reaches
the following critical value:
0* = r(r + 6 - a)K/3Eo. (33)
If 00o > 0*, the policy should be adopted immediately. If 0o < 0* and a > 0, the policy is
adopted at a later time T*, given by:
T* = log [r(r + - (34)
To interpret these results, let W0 be the value function when the policy is adopted at
time 0, let WN be the value function when the policy is never adopted, and let WT be the
value function when the policy is adopted at an arbitrary time T. These value functions are
simply:
Wo = -K, (35)
OEoOo
WN = (r - a)(r + - 36)
WT - E0o9[1 _ - -(r - )T] - KetrT. (37)(r - a)(r + 6 - a)
There are four possibilities. (1) Wo - WN < 0 and WT < WN for all T. In this case the
policy is never adopted. (2) Wo - WN > 0 and WT < Wo for all T > 0. In this case the
policy is adopted at t = 0. (3) Wo - WN < 0 but WT > WN for some range of T. In this
case the conventional NPV is initially negative, but will become positive in the future. the
policy is adopted at the time T* given by eqn. (34), which maximizes WT. (4) Wo - WN > 0
but WT > Wo for some range of T. Now the conventional NPV is positive, but it is better
to wait. Again, the policy is adopted at the T* that maximizes WT.
These four cases are illustrated in Figure 1. It is Case (4), however, that is most in-
teresting, because a simple calculation that compared adopting the policy now with never
adopting it would find a positive NPV. But it is better to wait; the NPV (calculated at
time t = 0) is larger if the policy is adopted at T* > 0. It may seem counterintuitive that
growth in the social cost of environmental damage should result in a delay in the adoption
of a policy to stop the damage. The reason for delay in this case is that waiting reduces the
cost of the policy by a factor of e-&T, but because 0 is growing at the rate a, waiting reduces
the benefit by the smaller factor of e- (r•- )T
This result is analogous to one for the optimal timing of a capital investment under
certainty. If the value of a project is non-stochastic but is growing over time, it may be
best to delay investing in the project even if the NPV for immediate investment is positive.
Again, this is because delaying the investment reduces the present value of its cost by more
than it reduces present value of its the payoff.13
A numerical example is again useful. Following up on our example from the previous
section, we will again assume that r = .04, 6 = .02, / = 1 Eo = 300,000 tons/year, and 00 =
$20/ton/year. We will also assume that a = .005, and we will consider different values for K.
Figure 2 shows Wo, WN, and WT as functions of T for K = $3.5 billion. This corresponds to
Case (3); Wo < WN, but WT eventually exceeds WN, reaching a maximum value of - $3.05
billion at T* = 50 years. Case (4) is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows Wo, WN, and WT
for K = $2.9 billion. Now We > WN, but it is better to wait. Wo = -$2.90 billion, but WT
attains a maximum value of -$2.86 billion at T* = 12 years.
3See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pages 138-139, for a discussion. This point was first noted by Marglin
(1963, Chapter 2).
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Figure 1: Policy Timing Under Certainty.
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Figure 2: Numerical Example - a = .005, K = $3.5 billion.
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5. Cost-Benefit Uncertainty.
We now generalize the model to allow for continuous stochastic fluctuations in the social
benefit function, and policy adoption at any point in time. Initially, we will continue to
assume that policy adoption implies reducing E to zero. This is indeed optimal if the cost of
emission reduction is a linear function of the size of the reduction, and if B(Mt, Ot) is linear
in Mr. Later we will make the cost of reducing emissions a convex function of the size of the
reduction, and then allow for incremental reductions in E over time.
We introduce uncertainty by letting 0 follow the geometric Brownian motion:
dO = aOdt + cOdz. (38)
For the time being we will assume that the cost of reducing E from its initial value, E0 , to
zero is K = kEo. The problem is to find a rule for policy adoption that maximizes the net
present value function of eqn. (4) subject to eqn. (38) for 0 and eqn. (1) for M.
We can solve this problem using dynamic programming by defining the net present value
function for each of two regions. Let WN(O, M) denote the value function for the "no-adopt"
region (so that Et = Eo), and let WA(0, M) denote the value function for the "adopt" region
(in which Et = 0). Then WN(0, M) must satisfy the following Bellman equation:14
rWN = -OM + (#Eo - 8M)WNM + aOW9N + a2W2 o . (39)
Likewise, WA(0, M) must satisfy the Bellman equation:
rWA = -OM - 6MWA + aOW A + a20 2WO. (40)
These equations must be solved subject to the following boundary conditions:
WN(0, M) = 0, (41)
WN(*',M) = WA(O*,M) - K, (42)
W (O*, M) = WA(O*,M). (43)
14For an introduction to or review of the mathematical tools used in this paper, see Chapters 3 and 4 of
Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
Here 0* is the critical value of 0 at or above which the policy should be adopted. Condition
(41) reflects the fact that if 0 is ever zero, it will remain at zero. Condition (42) is the value
matching condition; it simply says that when 0 = 0* and society exercises its option to adopt
the policy, it incurs a sunk cost K = kEo and hence receives the net payoff WA(O*, M) - K.
Condition (43) is the "smooth pasting condition;" if adoption at 0* is indeed optimal, the
derivative of the value function must be continuous at 0*.
These differential equations and associated boundary conditions have the following solu-
tion:
WN(0, M) = AO - OM E(44)
r+6-a (r -a)(r + -a)()
and
OM
WA(0, M) = (45)
r +6- a'
where A is a positive constant to be determined, and, from boundary condition (41), 7 is
the positive root of the quadratic equation ½!2y7(7 - 1) + a7 - r = 0, i.e.,
1 a a 1\ 2  2r (46)
27+ > 1. (46)
WN, the present value function that applies before adoption of the policy, has three
components. The first term on the right-hand side of (44) is the value of the option to
adopt the policy at some time in the future. The second term is the present value of the
flow of social cost resulting from the current stock of pollutant, M. (The current stock,
M, decays at the rate 6, while 0 has an expected rate of growth a, so the present value is
-OM/(r + 6 - a).) The third term is the present value of the flow of social cost that would
result if emissions continued at the rate E0 forever. (The present value of the flow of cost
from emissions Eo now is 3Eo0/(r + 6 - a), but the present value of cost for emissions E0
now and in all future periods is fEoO/(r + 6 - a)(r - a).) Note that this last component
of social cost is reduced by the value of the option to reduce emissions, i.e., the first term.
Once the policy has been adopted, E = 0 and the value function WA applies. Then the only
social cost is from the current stock of pollutant.
There are still two unknowns, the constant A and critical value 0* at which the policy
should be adopted, and they are determined from boundary conditions (42) and (43):
A = _--1 [ Eo (47)( K ) (r - a)(r + 6 - a)^ '
= (K ) [(r - a)(r + 6 -a)Y (48)
We can now see how the optimal timing of policy adoption depends on the degree of
uncertainty over future costs and benefits, and on other parameters. First, note that an
increase in a implies a decrease in -r and hence an increase in 0*. As we would expect, the
greater the uncertainty over the future social cost of the pollutant, the greater the incentive
to wait rather than adopt the policy now, and hence the greater must be the current cost in
order to trigger adoption. Second, an increase in the discount rate r increases the value of
the option to adopt the policy and thus also increases 0*. This is analogous to the effect of
a change in the interest rate on the value and optimal exercise point for a financial option;
an increase in r implies that lead to a bigger reduction in the present value of the cost K of
policy adoption, so that the option to adopt is worth more but it should be exercised later.
Third, an increase in 6, the rate of "depreciation" of the stock of pollutant, also increases
0*; a higher 6 implies that the environmental damage from emissions is less irreversible, so
that the sunk benefit of adopting the policy now rather than waiting is reduced.
Also, observe that an increase in the initial rate of emissions Eo leaves 0* unchanged (but
increases the value of society's option to adopt the emission-reducing policy), the reason is
that K = kEo, so that 0* is independent of Eo, and A increases linearly with E0 . Finally,
0* is also independent of M. Because B(M, 0) is linear in M (so that the value function is
linear in M), any given level of Mt implies the same reduction in social welfare if the policy
is adopted at time t as it does if the policy is not adopted. Hence WN(O, M) - WA(0, M) is
independent of M, and so is 0*.
In Section 3 we saw that the policy timing problem could be framed in terms of a
comparison of the opportunity costs of current adoption with the corresponding opportunity
"benefits." We can do the same thing here. In Section 3 we calculated WT - Wo, i.e., the
value function when a decision is made at a (fixed) future time T less the value function when
the policy is adopted immediately. In the current model, T is unknown, but we can calculate
W* - Wo, where W* is the value function when the adoption decision is made optimally.
Suppose 0 < 0*, so that W* = WN. Then W* - Wo = WN - Wo = WN - WA + K, or
/Eo0W* - Wo = K + AO - E (49)(r - c)(r +6-c) (
The first term on the right-hand side of (49) is the direct cost of current adoption. The
second term is value of the option to adopt, and since adoption implies "killing" this option,
it is an opportunity cost of current adoption. The last term is the present value of the
additional flow of social cost from continued emissions, and thus is an opportunity "benefit"
of current adoption. Since 0 < 0* and W* - Wo < 0, the direct cost and opportunity cost
outweigh this opportunity benefit, and adoption should be delayed.
Note that the way this model is currently structured, we would never want to reduce
emissions by anything less than 100 percent (assuming we would want to reduce them at
all). The reason is that with K = kEo, the value of the option to adopt the policy, AOr, is
linear in E0, so that WN and WA are linear in M and E 0. Shortly we will generalize the
model so that K is nonlinear. Then we can examine policies that involve a one-time partial
reduction in emissions, as well as gradual incremental reductions in emissions.
As before, we will use a numerical example to explore the characteristics of the solution.
Suppose a = 0 (so that the expected social cost per unit of M is constant), r = .04, 6 = .02,
a = .20, 3 = 1, Eo = 300,000 tons per year, 0o = $20 per ton, and k = 6667 so that K =
$2 billion. Then -r = 2.0, A = 1,953,125, and 0* = $32 per ton. Hence at the current value
of 00 = 20, the policy should not be adopted, but the value of society's option to adopt it,
A9, is $0.78 billion. The policy should only be adopted when 0 reaches $32 per ton; at that
point AP = $2.0 billion, and the reader can check that boundary conditions (42) and (43)
are satisfied.
Figure 4 shows this solution graphically for M = 0 (so that WA = 0 for all values of
0). Note that 0* is found at the point of tangency of WN with the line WA - K. (If M
were greater than zero, we would have WA = -OM/(r + 6 - a), so we would simply rotate
both WN(O) and the line WA - K downwards.) Figure 5 shows how the solution in Figure 4
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Figure 4: Solution for M = 0.
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Figure 6: 0* as a Function of a, 6 = .01, .02.
changes when a is increased. It shows the value functions and points of tangency for a equal
to .2 and .4, with the other parameters held constant. Note that when a is increased from
.2 to .4, 7-y falls (from 2 to 1.366), so that AO" becomes less convex, WN(0) flattens out, and
0* approximately doubles to a value of 59.72.
Figure 6 shows 0* as a function of a for two different values of 6 (.01 and .02), and
Figure 7 shows 0* as a function of 6 for a = 0.2 and 0.4. Note that for all values of 6, 0*
rises sharply with a. This is partly due to the fact that we have framed the policy problem
as an all-or-nothing proposition, but it nonetheless suggests that assessing uncertainty over
the future costs and benefits of emission reduction may be particulary critical to the policy
adoption decision.
Convex Costs and Partial Reduction in Emissions.
In Section 3 we examined policies that would only partially reduce emissions, but in the
context of a two-period decision framework (i.e., adopt the policy now or wait until a fixed
time T to decide). We now return to that problem, but allowing the policy to be adopted
at any time. As before, we will assume that the cost of the policy is a quadratic function of
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Figure 7: 0* as a Function of 6, a = .2, .4.
the amount that emissions are reduced:
K = ki(Eo - El) + k2(Eo - E1 )2 , (50)
where Eo - El is the amount of the reduction, and k1, k2 > 0. Again, the cost of a 1-unit
(permanent) reduction in E is k(E) = -dK/dE 1 = ki + 2k 2(Eo - E). As before, we must
find a rule (in the form of a critical value 0*) for the optimal timing of policy adoption, but
now we must also determine the optimal size of the reduction.
Once again, let WN(0, M) and WA(O, M) be the value functions for the "no-adopt" and
"adopt" regions respectively. WN(O, M) again satisfies eqn. (39). However, eqn. (40) for
WA(O, M) now has an additional term on the right-hand side: E1 WWA, where E1 is the level
of emissions after the policy has been adopted. Hence the solution for WA (0, M) is now:
WA(0, M) = 
(51M )E
r+6- - (r- )(r +6-a)
while the solution for WN(O, M) is again given by eqn. (44).
Remember that El is chosen optimally, and so will depend on 0 at the time of adoption,
i.e., on 0*. Hence although boundary condition (41) will still apply, conditions (42) and (43)
~rn
must be rewritten as:
WN(9*, M) = WA(0*, M) - K(E*(O*)), (52)
and
dK dE*
WN(,M) = WA(M) dE dO (53)
Using eqns. (51) and (50), we choose E* to maximize the net payoff from policy adoption:
OM PE,0
max[WA(O, M; E) - K(E)] = - + - - (-)(+ -)E r+6- a (r- a)(r+ a)
- ki(Eo - E) - k2(Eo - E) 2 , (54)
so that
E* = Eo + 0 (55)
2k 2  2k 2 (r - a)(r + 6 - a)
We now substitute this expression for E* into boundary conditions (52) and (53), and
then use these conditions to find 0* and A. Making the substitutions and denoting p -
(r - a)(r + 6 - a), we find that 0* is the largest root i s of the quadratic equation
(7 - 2)#202 - 2p(7 - 1)3k0, + 7 p2k2 = 0, i.e.,
0* = (7 - )k 1+ 1 ( - 2) (56)
#(f - 2) (f - 1)2
and A is given by:
A = 42/4k 2p2(0*)- - 2 - #kl/2k 2p(O*)- Y-1 + k2/4k2(0*) -'. (57)
Given 0*, we can find E*(O*) from eqn. (55). It is easy to confirm that as a increases (so
that 7 decreases), 0* will increase and E* will fall. However, we must have E* > 0, which
implies 0* < 0, = pkl/# + 2pk 2Eo/P, or equivalently, 7 > 2 + k,/k 2 Eo.16 If 0 is large enough
so that 7 < 2 + kl/k 2Eo, eqns. (56) and (57) will no longer apply. Instead, E* is constrained
to be zero and so is no longer a choice variable. In that case the solution to the optimal
15This is because WA(o)- wVN(o) - K(E*(O)) is convex in 0.
16Thus the condition from eqn. (56) that y > 2, which implies that a2 < r - 2a, will always be satified.
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Figure 8: Optimal Adoption Decision with Partial Emission Reduction.
timing problem is again given by eqns. (47) and (48) (with K = k1Eo + k2Eg2). Also, we
must have E* < Eo, but this will always be the case; observe from eqns. (55) and (56) that
E*(0*) < Eo for any -y > 2.17
Figure 8 illustrates this. It shows the conventional NPV from policy adoption when E 1
can be chosen optimally according to eqn. (55); that NPV is equal to (3/p)[Eo - E*(O)]O -
K(E*(O)). Also shown is the value of the option to adopt a policy, which is equal to AO" .
This NPV is a quadratic function of 0, and applies for values of 0 for which 0 < E*(O) < Eo;
in this range, the NPV is increasing in 0. The critical value 0* is at the point where the
option value A6O is just tangent to this NPV, i.e., where the value matching and smooth
pasting conditions (52) and (53) hold. In the figure, that critical value is shown as 01. If
1'7It might appear from eqn. (55) that if 8 is very small, E* will exceed E0. But as 6 becomes smaller, 0*
becomes larger, so that E* < E0 always.
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Figure 9: Partial Emission Reduction - kl = 5000, k2 = .055, a = .045.
a is large enough (or other parameters are sufficiently large or small) that 0* > 0m,, E1 is
constrained to be zero, so that the corresponding NPV is equal to (3/p)EoO - klEo - k2EO.
In the figure, a solution in this range is indicated by 02.
Figure 9 shows this solution for the following numerical example: Eo = 300, 000 tons per
year, kL = 5000 and k2 = .0055 (so that the cost of reducing E to zero would be about $2
billion), o = .045, and as before, a = 0, r = .04, 6 = .02, and # = 1. In this case, a policy is
never adopted for 0 < .,in = 12 (even if a is reduced to zero), and Om = 20. For a = .045,
-i = 6.8, so that 0* = 17, i.e., 0* < Om,• so that E* > 0. From eqn. (55)), we see that
E* = 110,606 tons per year.
The amount that emissions are reduced will depend on the degree of uncertainty over
the future benefits of reduction, and on other parameters. Figure 10 shows the dependence
of both E* and 0* on a for this numerical example. (In the figure, 0* is multiplied by 104
so that it can be plotted with E* on the same scale.) When a is equal to zero, the standard
NPV rule for the timing of adoption applies; the policy should be adopted if 0 > 12. If 0
is just slightly greater than 12, the policy is adopted but emissions are reduced only very
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Figure 10: Partial Emission Reduction - Dependence of E* and 0* on a.
slightly. (The reason is that a = 0, so if a = 0, 0 cannot rise in the future.) As a increases,
the critical value 0* also increases, and E* falls. Note that for a > .063, E* = 0, so that 0*
is given by eqn. (48) (with k1 Eo + k2EO2 substituted for K) rather than eqn. (56).
We can likewise determine the dependence of 0* and E* on other parameters from eqns.
(48), (55), and (56). For example, a higher initial level of emissions, Eo, does not affect the
critical value 8", but does imply a commensurately higher ending level E* (so that the size
of the reduction is unchanged). Also, an increase in kI increases 0*, but an increase in k2
has no effect on 0*, although it reduces the size of the emission reduction, Eo - E*, at the
time of adoption.
Convex Benefit Function.
In all of the cases examined so far, we have assumed that the benefit function B(M, 0)
is linear in M, and as a result, the optimal policy rules were always independent of M.
This was a convenient assumption that made it easier to analytically solve for the optimal
policy rule. However, for most environmental problems, the damage from a pollutant is like
to rise more than proportionally with the stock of the pollutant. If this is the case, the
optimal policy rule (i.e., the optimal timing and amount of emission reduction) will depend
on the stock, M. To explore this, let us go back to the case in which the cost of an emission
reduction is linear in the size of the reduction, and emissions must be reduced to zero once
a policy is adopted, so that K = kEo. But now we will assume that the benefit function
B(M, 0) is quadratic in M:
B(M, 0) = -0tM,2. (58)
Once again, we can write value functions WN(G, M) and WA(8, M) for the "no-adopt"
and "adopt" regions respectively. In this case, these value functions will again satisfy the
Bellman equations (39) and (40), but with the term -OM replaced by -OM 2 in each equa-
tion. The boundary conditions (41) - (43) also apply. These equations and boundary
conditions have the following solution:
OM 2  2#2E 0
WN(0, M) = AO -
0
r + 26 - a (r - a)(r + 26 - a)(r + 6 - a)
2-3EoOM (59)(r+ 26- )(r+ 6-a)'
and
OM 2
WA(, M) = - , (60)
r+26--a
where A is a positive constant to be determined, and -f is again given by eqn. (eq:thlingamma).
Note that the right-hand side of (60) and the second term on the right-hand side of (59) is
the present value of the flow of social cost from the present stock of pollutant, M. The third
and fourth terms on the right-hand side of (59) are the present value of the flow of social
cost from future emissions at the rate E0, and the first term on the right-hand side of (59)
is the value of the option to reduce emissions to zero.
The constant A and critical value 0*, which are found from boundary conditions (42) and
(43), are given by:
A E '7-' 2#2Eo + 20(r - a)M (61)S k (r - a) (r + 26 -a))(r + - a)y (61)
0* = (r - a)(r + 26 - a)(r + 6 - a)k (62)
2/3(7 - 1)[#E + (r - a)M]
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The critical value 0* now depends on M; a higher value of M implies a higher marginal
social cost from additional emissions, and therefore a lower value of 0 at which it is optimal
to begin reducing emissions. (For the same reason, a higher value of M increases the value of
the option to reduce emissions.) The rising marginal social cost of emissions likewise implies
that the higher is the current emission level, E0 , the lower will be 0*. As before, a higher
cost of emission reduction, k, and a higher rate of "depreciation" of the stock of pollutant,
6, leads to a higher value of 0*.
Most important, uncertainty affects the optimal adoption rule the same way it does when
B(O, M) is linear in M; the parameter a affects 0* through the multiplier (7 - 1)/7, and 7 is
given by the same equation (46) as before. Hence we find that making the benefit function
convex in M affects the optimal policy adoption rule, but it does not affect the way that
rule depends on uncertainty over the future social costs of pollution. The critical value 0*
for the certainty case is multiplied by the same factor as it is when the benefit function is
linear in M.
6. Cost-Benefit Uncertainty - Gradual Emission Reductions.
In the preceding section we assumed that there would be only one opportunity to adopt
an emissions-reducing policy. This is not terribly unrealistic; given the political difficulties
of reaching a concensus on and introducing a major new environmental policy, it is unlikely
that regulations regarding emissions could be revised very frequently. On the other hand,
assuming that such regulations could never be revised (once a new policy is in place) is
extreme. Rather than making arbitrary assumptions about the allowed frequency of policy
change (or making assumptions about "menu costs" of policy change so that the frequency
is endogenous), I will assume the opposite extreme - that the level of emissions can be
reduced gradually and continuously. Comparing the optimal policy in this case with that
from the preceding section should provide some insight into how the frequency with which
regulations can be introduced or substantively changed will affect the optimal timing and
design of policy.
In this section I will again assume that the cost of any incremental emission reductions is
completely sunk, which is equivalent to assuming that emissions can only be reduced. (This
assumption can easily be relaxed by making the cost of emission reductions only partly
sunk.) Policy makers must observe the stock veriable M, and decide when and by how much
to mandate emissions reductions in response to increases in M.'8
For this problem to be of any interest, either the benefit function or the cost function must
be convex. I will assume that the benefit function B(O, M) is again linear in 0 and M, and
that the cost of the policy is a quadratic function of the amount that emissions are reduced,
as in eqn. (50). Thus the cost of a 1-unit reduction in E is AK = kL + 2k 2(Eo - El). For
notational convenience, let mi = kI + 2k 2Eo and m 2 = 2k 2, so that the cost of an incremental
reduction in E can be written as:
AK = mi - m 2 E. (63)
Since Bt = -OtMt, the payoff flow from a small reduction in the stock of pollutant, AMt,
is just ABt = -OtAMt. If emissions are reduced incrementally by an amount AE at time
t = 0, the corresponding change in Mt is
AMt = 6 11 - e- t 1 (64)
so the social benefit from an incremental reduction in emissions at time t is:
AW, = £t AB e- (' - t ) dr = QOtAE/p, (65)
where p - (r - a)(r + 6 - a). Given the current value of Ot, the problem is to determine how
far to reduce emissions initially, and then how to make any further reductions in response
to changes in 0.
This problem is analogous to the incremental investment and capacity choice problem in
Pindyck (1988). (See also Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chapter 11.) Suppose that Et = E
"sI am implicitly assuming here that M can be observed without error. In many cases - e.g., GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere - one would only have an estimate of M. Later in this paper I examine how
uncertainty over the evolution of M should affect the policy decision, but I do not examine the implications
of uncertainty over the current value of M. Also, note that in some cases, one could, through the expenditure
of time and money, make it possible to obtain better estimates of M. (This has been one of the goals of
recent geophysical research on global warming.) This leads to a stochastic control problem in which resources
spent on estimation must be balanced against resources spent on direct control of emissions. See Rausser
and Howitt (1975) for an example.
currently, and let W(E; 0, M) be the value function given this E, and given the current
values of 8 and M. Let AF be the value of society's option to (permanently) reduce E by
one unit. Note that the cost of exercising that option is AF(E; 0, M) + AK(E), and the
payoff is AW(8). Then AF must satisfy the Bellman equation:
rAF = (PE - 6M)AFM + aOAFo + o'2 2AFooe , (66)
subject to the boundary conditions:
AF(E; 0, M) = 0, (67)
AF(E; 0*, M) = AW(O*) - AK(E), (68)
AFe(E; 0*, M) = AWo(8*). (69)
Since AW and AK are independent of M, AF will be independent of M, and the solution
has the usual form:
AF = aPO, (70)
with y > 1 again given by eqn. (46). Emissions should be reduced whenever 0 exceeds the
critical value 0*(E), with dO*/dE < 0. The constant a and the critical value 0*(E) are found
from boundary conditions (68) and (69):
-7P(mi - m 2 E)0*(E) = , (71)(r - 1) 1
a = (A -( E - (72)7P mi - m2E
where p - (r - a)(r + 6 - a).
To interpret (71), note that p(mi - m 2E)/1 is the amortized sunk cost of an incremental
reduction in emissions, normalized by the absorption rate 0. Since the benefit function
B(9, M) is linear, in the absence of uncertainty it would be optimal to reduce emissions to
the point where this amortized sunk cost is just equal to to 0, the social cost per period of
an incremental unit of the stock of pollutant, M. With uncertainty, the threshold exceeds
this amortized sunk cost by the multiple y/('y - 1). Also, note that as E is reduced, 0*
rises (and a falls). Depending on the initial value of 0, it may be optimal to initially reduce
emissions by some large amount, and then later reduce emissions gradually when 0 increases
and hits the boundary 0*. For any value of E, 0* is increased if a increases, and is decreased
if the "depreciation" rate S increases. Finally, given 0*(E), we can determine the optimal
emissions level E*.
In this model, uncertainty affects the initial level of mandated emissions reductions, and it
also affects the maximum allowed emissions level over time. I used a numerical example and
ran a Monte Carlo simulation to examine the magnitude of these effects and its dependence
on a. In this example, the initial emissions level is Eo = 300,000 tons per year, the cost
function parameters for eqn. (63) are ki = 5000 and k2 = .0055 (so that the cost of reducing
E from 300,000 tons per year to zero would be about $2 billion), and as in earlier examples,
r = .04, 6 = .02, and / = 1. In this example, we set a = .01, so that even in the absence of
uncertainty, emissions will gradually be reduced over time as 0 increases. I varied a from 0
to .15, in increments of .005. For each value of a, I ran 10,000 simulations of the evolution
of 0 and the corresponding optimal emissions level E*.
Figure 11 shows the results of this Monte Carlo simulation for the mean optimal emissions
level initially, and after 20 years. Note that when there is no uncertainty (i.e., a = 0),
emissions are initially reduced from 300,000 to about 70,000 tons per year, and then reduced
gradually to zero as 0 and the corresponding social cost of pollution rises. As a is increased,
the initial allowed emissions level increases, reflecting the value of waiting. Emissions are
still reduced over time (although reductions occur stochastically when a > 0), but the mean
value of E* after 20 years also increases with a.
Figure 12 shows the mean and median times until the optimal emissions level has been
reduced to zero. Both the mean and median times should increase monotonically with a,
because increases in a increase the threshold 0*(E) for every value of E. In the figure, the
mean time decreases for a > .13, but this is an artifact of the Monte Carlo simulation. (In
each run, the model was simulated for 1000 years, and for large values of a, there will be
runs for which it takes longer than this for E* to reach zero. In addition, the number of
runs at this tail of the distribution is very small.) Note that because the distribution of the
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Figure 11: Mean Optimal Emissions Level at t = 0 and 20 Years.
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Figure 12: Mean and Median Times until Emissions are Reduced to Zero.
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time until zero-emissions is asymmetric, the mean time will exceed the median time for all
a > 0. The difference between the mean time and median time illustrates an important
aspect of the effects of uncertainty. There is a value of waiting (i.e., reducing emissions less
than would be the case otherwise) because of the possibility that 0 will not increase as much
as expected. For a > 0, there are indeed realizations in which it takes a very long time for 0
to grow to the point where eliminating emissions is justified. This is another example of the
"good news principle" mentioned earlier in this paper - the tail of the distribution drives
the initial amount by which emissions are reduced.
In this section and the preceding one, we considered two extreme assumptions regarding
policy adoption. In the preceding section we assumed that there would be only one op-
portunity to adopt an emissions-reducing policy, whereas in this section we assumed that
emissions could be reduced continuously over time. Reality lies somewhere in between these
two extremes. Nonetheless, the basic implications of uncertainty are the same - there is
an incentive to go slow, delaying policy adoption in the one-time-only case, and initially
reducing emissions by a smaller amount in the continuous case.
7. Ecological Uncertainty.
Up to this point, the only form of uncertainty that we have considered has been over
the parameter 0 that shifts the benefit function B. In this section, we will assume that 0
remains fixed, but that there is uncertainty over the evolution of M. Specifically, we replace
eqn. (1) by the following stochastic differential equation:
dM = (OE - SM)dt + adz. (73)
Thus even if the trajectory for Et were known, future values of M are uncertain (and normally
distributed).19
19It might seem more natural to assume that future values of M are lognormally distributed, i.e., to
describe the evolution of M by
dM = (PE - bM)dt + aMdz.
Then M could never become negative. I use eqn. (73) instead because it simplifies the numerical solution
of the model. The basic results would still apply if M were lognormally distributed.
For uncertainty of this kind to have any effect on policy timing or design, the benefit
function B(, M) must be convex in M. (If this function were linear in M, stochastic
fluctuations in M would have no effect on the expected marginal social return from reductions
in E, and thus would not affect the optimal policy, even if K(E) were nonlinear.) We will
therefore assume that the benefit function is quadratic in M, i.e., B(M, 0) = -OMt2. For
simplicity, we will also assume that the cost of an emission reduction is linear in the size
of the reduction, and emissions must be reduced to zero once a policy is adopted, so that
K= kEo.
We can now proceed as before, writing the Bellman equations for the value functions WN
and WA in the "no-adopt" and "adopt" regions:
rWN = -OM 2 + (#Eo - 6M)WN + a2 WM , (74)
rWA = -OM 2 - 6MWA + c, 2W M . (75)
The value functions must also satisfy the boundary conditions:
WA(O) = 0, (76)
WN(M*) = WA(M*) - K , (77)
WN(M*) = WA (M*), (78)
where M* is the critical value of M that triggers policy adoption.
Note that there is now only one state variable (M), so that eqns. (74) and (75) are
ordinary differential equations. The solution for WA is simply:
W MM2  a2 0
WA(M) +2 (+2) (79)r + 26 r(r + 26)
This is just the present value of the flow of social cost from the current stock of the pollutant,
M. Note that an increase in a implies an increase in the magnitude of WA. This is an
implication of Jensen's inequality; WA is a convex function of M.
Eqn. (74) for WN, however, does not have an analytical solution. Instead, this equation
must be solved numerically for WN(M) and the critical value M', by making use of the
02 
-2
o
C
-6
*n -6
-8
-in
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
M (Millions of Tons per Year)
Figure 13: Solution Method for Stochastic M.
(Note: K = 4, Eo = .3, a = 1, 0 = .002.)
solution for WA(M) given by eqn. (79), along with the boundary conditions (77) and (78).
Obtaining a numerical solution in this case is straightforward. Begin with a candidate for
the critical value M* that triggers policy adoption, say, M*. Then use eqns. (79), (77), and
(78) to get WN(M0) and WjT (Mg), and solve eqn. (74) backwards to determine a candidate
solution for WN(M) for all M between 0 and M&. To be the actual solution, the candidate
solution must, for all values of M between 0 and Mg, satisfy the conditions WMN < 0 and
WN&M < 0. The candidate for M* is adjusted until these conditions are satisfied.
This solution method is easiest to see in the context of an example. We will measure the
stock of pollutant, M, in millions of tons, the emission rate in millions of tons per year, and
the value functions WA and WN and adoption cost in billions of dollars. Since the benefit
function is B = -WM 2 , we measure 0 in billion dollars/(million tons)2 . Then, we set K = 4,
Eo = .3, 0 = .002, a = 1, a = 0, and, as in our earlier examples, r = .04, 6 = .02, and 0 = 1.
In this case, the solution for M* is 13.05. Figure 13 shows how this solution is obtained. The
figure shows candidate solutions for WN(M) corresponding to different values of M', along
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Figure 14: Solution for Stochastic M - K = 4, Eo = .3, o = 1, 0 = .002.
with WA(M) - K. Note that for candidate values of M* below 13.05, WfN(M) > 0 for small
values of M, and for candidate values above 13.05, WINM(M) > 0 for small values of M.
The solution procedure simply searches over candidate values of M*, using an increasingly
narrow range.
Figure 14 shows this same solution, but for values of M ranging from 0 to 20 million tons.
Note that for M < M*, the curve for WN(M) applies, and for M > M*, WA(M) applies.
Finally, Figure 15 shows how this solution changes in response to changes in the value of a.
Solutions are shown for a = 0, 1, and 2. Observe that as a is increased, the critical value M*
increases. This is a standard result; the value of the option to adopt the policy increases,
and hence the value of waiting increases. Likewise, the expected present value of the social
cost of pollution, before or after policy adoption, becomes larger.
8. A General Model.
In the general case, both 0 and M are stochastic. We will assume as we did in Section 5
that 0 follows geometric Brownian motion:
dO = aOdt + aeOdzl, (80)
u-2
-4
o -6
C
-8
U-,
m
: -12
-14
-16
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
M (Millions of Tons per Year)
Figure 15: Solution for Stochastic M - o = 1, 2, and 3.
and that M follows a controlled arithmetic Brownian motion:
dM = (PE - SM)dt + 2dz2 , (81)
with E(dzldz2 ) = 0. We will also assume that the social benefit function is quadratic, i.e.,
B(O, M) = -OM 2.
We proceed as before, writing the Bellman equations for the value functions WN(O, M)
and WA(0, M) in the "no-adopt" and "adopt" regions respectively:
rWN = -OM 2 + (PEo - 8M)WV + aWN + 1.•0 2Wo + • •2W M, (82)
rWA = -aOM - 6MWA + a•W1A + 2O2WA + MW M (83)
These value functions must also satisfy the boundary conditions:
WA(0, M) = 0, (84)
WN(0, M) = 0 , (85)
WN(0*(M), M) = WA(*(M), M) - K, (86)
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Figure 16: Free Boundary for General Model.
Wo(0*(M), M) = W9A(O*(M), M). (87)
Now the free boundary that separates the adopt from the no-adopt regions is a function
0*(M), with dO'/dM < 0. Given M, the policy should be adopted only if 0 > 0*(M).
Figure 16 illustrates this.
As in the case when only M was stochastic, we can obtain an analytical solution for
WA(, M):
0M2 29'WA(O,M) - M o(88)
r -a + 26 (r -a)(r -a + 2S)
As before, this is the present value of the flow of social cost from the current stock of the
pollutant, M. Again, an increase in a implies an increase in the magnitude of WA, because
WA is a convex function of M.
Eqn. (82) for WN(0, M) does not have an analytical solution. However, it can be solved
numerically for WN(O, M) and for the free boundary 0*(M), by making use of the solution
for WA(O, M) along with the boundary conditions (86) and (87).
Arx\
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